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It is difficult to say which problem associated with divorce is the
most predominant or severe. Undoubtedly, the personal crisis that befalls
the members of the family unit is enduring and difficult to resolve. Courts
and attorneys may seek, by order or agreement, to establish guidelines for
such matters as custody and visitation, but the inefficacy of our system of
justice is highlighted by the increasing number of family victims seeking
psychiatric assistance for their adjustment to new lives.
In the pendency of a divorce, the lawyer is more effective in dealing
with the financial affairs of his clients than are the clients themselves.
Aside from the personal and psychological consequences of a broken
marriage, the family members are faced with the problem of arriving at an
acceptable means of surviving within the bounds of their new economic
situation. The marital residence usually is the focal point of the financial
arrangement.
Within traditional notions, the "home" is more than the living
quarters of a family. It is at once the symbol of many intangible, yet vital,
links in the family's identity: security, success, solidarity, independence,
and stability, to name a few. Not surprisingly, the marital "home" often
stands at the center of negotiations in the war between spouses. The
marital residence is both sword and shield in the strategical game that is
often played at the emotional and psychological expense of the clients and
their families. The following discussion will center upon the varying
rights and liabilities that arise from the ownership or occupancy of the
marital residence.
II. The Unwritten Law
Although equalization of the sexes may obliterate the stereotype of
the male as breadwinner and the female as housewife, the historical
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relationship still provides some authority for the statement that when the
marital partners separate, it is the woman, especially if she retains
custody of minor children, who demands that any settlement accord her
an unassailable right to exclusive ownership and possession of the marital
residence. From that custom has arisen the expression "the woman gets
the house!"
While there is no legal requirement that it be so, negotiations
generally begin with the marital residence-the typical family's primary
asset. Often there can be no fruitful discussion between the parties or their
attorneys until the disposition of the marital residence has been effected.
In practice, the manner in which title to the premises is held is generally
of little significance in the demands of the parties. The claiming spouse
frequently ignores the realities of ownership when discussing the
"equities" of the situation.
Since Pennsylvania is a "fault" state,' the relative footing of the
parties may be weighed by simply examining the facts and circumstances
of the separation. If the claiming spouse is either "innocent" or has not
behaved heinously, he or she stands to gain great financial advantage over
the "culpable" spouse. The inability of the latter to obtain a divorce
without escaping to a "no-fault" state acts as an incentive to meet the
demands of the spouse seeking possession or ownership of the marital
residence-especially if the claiming spouse is the one who can proclaim
that "the woman gets the house."
III. Support Overtones
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
The courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over support matters. 2
Either plaintiff or defendant must reside in the Commonwealth in order to
bring a support action.3 The more difficult and common problem is to
obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has avoided service of
process by leaving the Commonwealth. If the defendant is unable to be
served personally, quasi in rem jurisdiction may be obtained for the
purposes of pursuing the support action by attaching property belonging
to the defendant.4 Property that is owned by the entireties, which would
include the marital residence, 5 may serve as the basis for obtaining
1. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955).
2. Id. tit. 62, § 2043.12 (Purdon 1968); id. tit. 23, § 15(1) (Purdon Supp. 1976).
3. Id. tit. 48, § 131 (Purdon 1965).
4. Id. § 32.
5. DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 1974 (1975) (household goods); In re
Carnevalino's Estate, 435 Pa. 336, 257 A.2d 546 (1969) (mortgages); In re Brose's Estate,
416 Pa. 386, 206 A.2d 301 (1965) (bank deposits); Wallaesa v. Wallaesa, 174 Pa. Super. Ct.
192, 100 A.2d 149 (1953) (notes); In re Smulyan, 98 F. Supp. 618 (M.D. Pa. 1951) (United
States savings bonds); O'Boyle v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Pa.
1937) (life insurance policies).
jurisdiction over a spouse who has deserted or otherwise abandoned his
family 6
Obtaining jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that the courts will
be able to compel the appearance of the defendant in the initiating county.
If the new residence of the defendant is known and it is in a county or
state other than that in which suit was commenced, the defendant is
entitled to require that the "responding" county or state hear the case and
issue the order. 7
B. Consideration as to Amount
In determining the appropriate amount of support, a court is not
restricted to the actual earnings and income of the parties. The court may
consider not only the parties' "earning capacity," but the nature and
extent of each party's property or other financial resources.8 If the marital
residence is owned by the defendant-spouse, it may be considered for its
"income potential" in arriving at a support order, 9 but it is unlikely that a
court would consider the residence as a factor if it were occupied by the
plaintiff-spouse and the children.
If the property is owned by the entireties, the same rule should
apply. In Gitman v. Gitman l° the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recognized that entireties property could be subject to execution for
delinquent support payments and could be considered in computing the
amount of support order. Despite the right of the courts to consider the
marital residence as one of the resources owned by one or both of the
parties in fashioning a support award, however, appellate courts have
held that support proceedings cannot be utilized to divide or distribute the
defendant-spouse's estate.11
C. The Effect of Cohabitation or Sharing the Household
One of the most effective tactical weapons available to a party
engaged in domestic conflict is that which flows as a consequence of
physical possession of the marital residence. There is a general rule
providing that an order of support will not be issued if the parties are
living together and the record does not present an obvious failure to
provide for the family's needs.'
2
6. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 132 (Purdon 1965); id. tit. 62, § 1977 (Purdon 1968).
7. Id. tit. 62, §§ 2043-1 to 2043-44 (Purdon 1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Powell v.
Powell, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 369, 357 A.2d 566 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Roviello v. Roviello, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 428, 323
A.2d 766 (1974); Shuster v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 542, 323 A.2d 760 (1974).
9. Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967).
10. 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967).
11. Commonwealth ex rel. Bishop v. Bishop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 600, 341 A.2d 153
(1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Roviello v. Roviello, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 428, 323 A.2d 766
(1974).
12. Commonwealth ex rel. Gauby v. Gauby, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 92, 289 A.2d 745
(1972). This general rule is not applicable to alimony pendente lite, which the superior court
The question whether a spouse can pursue a support action for
inadequate or insufficient maintenance while the parties reside in the
same household has been answered in the negative by the supreme court,
which has declared that
[if a] husband provides a home, food, clothing and reasonable
medical attention, he cannot be directed to pay a given stipend
to the wife so that she may have it available for her own
personal disposition .
3
In a recent case, the superior court ruled that if a husband was paying the
fixed bills, including the mortgage installments, and giving his wife
twenty dollars per week, there could not be such neglect as to permit his
wife to obtain a support order.' 4 This rule is not without exception.
Should the defendant provide a modicum of support, but pursue a course
of conduct that degrades or humiliates the other party, an order of support
may be obtained even though the parties live in the same household. ' 5
This position taken by our courts has been and continues to be a
vicious weapon in the negotiations of the parties. A common hypothetical
may illustrate its effectiveness. A husband and wife decJide to separate.
The minor children go to school and have many friends in the neighbor-
hood. Mindful of the difficulties the children will have in adjusting to the
marital breakdown, the parties decide that the wife should remain in the
house with the children while the husband takes up residence in an
apartment of his own.
After many years of marriage, during which "child-bearing" years
she was unemployed, the wife feels the need to obtain a suitable income
and sufficient assets to continue living in the style to which she and her
children have become accustomed. The husband has similarly become
accustomed to his independence and would like to secure a substantial
standard of living for himself. Being thwarted in her individual desires,
the wife institutes a support action even though her husband has been
paying a weekly sum that he considers to be sufficient for her needs. The
husband is advised that if he moves back into the house the support action
can be aborted even if he has no desire to resume a marital relationship
with his wife. Husband returns; wife consults her attorney and finds that
she is powerless to act because the marital residence is jointly owned and
her husband therefore has an absolute right to return and lie in it with
her. 16
If the husband now cuts down his weekly payments so as to provide
only the bare necessities of the household, he can go about his "single
has held may be awarded even when the parties are living in the same household, without a
requirement that the plaintiff-spouse establish willful neglect or denial of necessities.
Wechsler v. Wechsler, - Pa. Super. Ct. - , 363 A.2d 1307 (1976).
13. Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948).
14. Scuro v. Scuro, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 592, 323 A.2d 49 (1974).
15. DiPadova v. DiPadova, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 408, 302 A.2d 510 (1973).
16. Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948).
life," sleep in a separate bedroom, and come and go as he pleases without
fear of legal consequences. On the other hand, the wife must be careful
not to commit any indiscretions since adulterous conduct on her part
would cut off any support to which she might otherwise be entitled.17
Once the wife has "come to her senses," the husband may move out
and resume negotiations with the hope that the threat of returning will be
a sufficient deterrent to avoid the "unreasonable" demands made by his
wife during the prior negotiations. This weapon cannot, of course, be
utilized to avoid the duty of support if the marital residence is owned
solely by the plaintiff-spouse.
This horrific script is one that is repeated in many marital disputes by
parties who have been frustrated by months or years of fruitless negoti-
ations. Despite the good intentions that the parties may have had at the
outset of their separation, the gradual erosion of harmony that attends a
prolonged separation often brings them to this tragic juncture. Unfortu-
nately, more often than not the victims of this strategy are the children.
As long as the law remains stringent on this subject, the "game" will be
played.
IV. A Man's Castle
Although the marital residence may be jointly owned, thereby creat-
ing equal rights of title and possession in the parties, an anachronism in
the law continues despite the adoption of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights
Amendment. 8 The law has long recognized that a woman must live in the
house chosen by her husband.1 9 A husband may require his wife to
change her domicile if his work, comfort or convenience requires it.2' In
fact, a wife's refusal to move with her husband can constitute desertion.
21
The qualification upon this rule is that a husband has a continuing duty to
provide a suitable home, and the new home chosen must be one that is
amenable to the family's needs.22
Whether this rule of law will prevail when confronted by a direct
attack under the Equal Rights Amendment remains to be seen. The
superior court -has hinted that it would consider this constitutional ques-
tion in a light most favorable to women if presented upon appeal.23 Until
the resolution of this issue, the present law makes the woman the subser-
vient occupant of the home even if she is an equal partner with her mate in
the ownership of the premises.
17. Commonwealth ex rel. Young v. Young, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 247 A.2d 659
(1968); Commonwealth v. Levitz, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 438, 150 A.2d 581 (1959).
18. PA. CONST, art. I, § 28.
19. DiMilia v. DiMilia, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 188, 203 A.2d 382 (1964).
20. Yohey v. Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 329,208 A.2d 902 (1965); Fitelson v. Fitelson,
189 Pa. Super. Ct. 366, 150 A.2d 389 (1959).
21. Santarsiero v. Santarsiero, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 331 A.2d 868 (1974); Yohey v.
Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 208 A.2d 902 (1965).
22. Urbaczewski v. Urbaczewski, 158 Pa. Super. Ct. 614, 45 A.2d 925 (1946).
23. Smith v. Smith, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 340 A.2d 552 (1975).
V. Ownership of Contents
The Equal Rights Amendment has served to eliminate many time-
worn doctrines founded upon sexually discriminate treatment between the
marital parties. 24 One of these concerned the ownership of the contents of
a marital residence.
Under prior law,25 it was presumed that household goods belonged
to the husband. This presumption was based upon the premise that the
husband as "breadwinner" had paid for these items. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania abolished this common-law presumption in DiFlorido v.
DiFlorido,26 declaring that the household contents must be viewed as
presumptively owned by the entireties. The court acknowledged "the
equally important and often substantial non-monetary contributions made
by either spouse."27 Thus the ownership of the marital residence is not
important in the resolution of title to its contents. Whether the residence is
owned solely or jointly has no bearing on how the contents should be
divided.
VI. Changing the Locks
One of the most common questions that a domestic relations client
asks an attorney is whether or not the locks on the marital residence may
be changed following separation. Whether there was a desertion or the
separation was voluntary does not alter the general approach to this
problem. Unless there has been physical abuse, locks may not be changed
without assumption of the accompanying peril of such action.
A spouse may not appropriate entireties property without the consent
or subsequent approval of the other spouse. Changing the locks or other
conduct amounting to exclusion of one spouse by the other permits the
"innocent" spouse to institute a partition action or a proceeding for an
accounting as to the property.2" Since the owners of entireties property
are entitled to its mutual use,29 the exclusion of one spouse by the other
creates an "offer" to destroy the tenancy and divide the property. The
"offer" is "accepted" by instituting partition or accounting pro-
ceedings.30
24. See Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974) (husband has right to
seek support from wife); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973)
(husband may seek divorce from bed and board, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and
costs in a divorce action); Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973)
(wife has right to husband's consortium).
25. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 31 (Purdon 1965) (repealed by Act of July 17, 1957, P.L.
969, No. 417, § 2).
26. 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2l 174 (1975).
27. Id. at 650, 331 A.2d at 179.
28. Shoup v. Shoup, - Pa. - , 364 A.2d 1319 (1976); Backus v. Backus, 464 Pa. 380,
346 A.2d 790 (1975); Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 413 Pa. 342, 196 A.2d 324 (1964).
29. Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530, 153 A.2d 901 (1959); Flood v. Flood, 9
Adams 46, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 283 (C.P. 1967).
30. Backus v. Backus, 464 Pa. 380, 346 A.2d 790 (1975).
The right of the excluded spouse to seek a pre-divorce partition
applies not only to real property, but also to personalty owned jointly by
the parties. 3 1 It should be pointed out, however, that appropriation. by a
spouse of household property-i.e. personal property applied to the
mutual use, enjoyment or benefit of the spouses, including the support of
minor children-is deemed not to be wrongful 32 and therefore does not
fall within the purview of the discussion in this subsection. Implications
of the not infrequent practice of changing locks after separation are,
therefore, extremely serious and should be avoided unless absolutely
necessary.
VII. Protection from Abuse
On October 7, 1976, the Protection from Abuse Act became effec-
tive. 33 This statute permits a spouse, under limited circumstances, to
exclude the other spouse from use of or access to the marital residence.
The Act recognizes the ever-present danger that physical abuse may be
inflicted upon one spouse by the other. Cognizant of the fact that the
marital residence may become a "torture chamber" or "prison" for a
victimized spouse, the law provides certain emergency relief.
The term "abuse" is defined in the statute as:
(i) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causing bodily injury or serious bodily injury with or
without a deadly weapon.
(ii) Placing by physical menace another in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury.
(iii) Sexually abusing minor children as defined pursuant
to the act of November 26, 1975 (No. 124), known as the "Child
Protective Services Law." 34
When such abuse has allegedly occurred, the common pleas courts have
the right to enter ex parte temporary restraining orders on behalf of the
plaintiff-spouse. Following a hearing, the court may grant orders that will
bring about a "cessation of abuse." These may include, without limita-
tion, orders
(1) Directing the defendant to refrain from abusing the
plaintiff or minor children.
(2) Granting possession to the plaintiff of the residence or
household to the exclusion of the defendant by evicting the
defendant and/or restoring possession to the plaintiff when the
residence or household is jointly owned or leased by the
parties.
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Bishop v. Bishop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 600, 341 A.2d 153
(1975).
32. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 224 A.2d 164 (1966); Glover v. Manupelli, 201 Pa.
Super. Ct. 429, 193 A.2d 758 (1963).
33. Act of October 7, 1976, P.L. -, No. 218, 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 600 (Purdon's) (to
be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190); see also, implementing court rules of
procedure, P.R. Civ. P. 1901-1905.
34. Id. § 2 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182).
(3) When the defendant has a duty to support the plaintiff
or minor children living in the residence or household and the
defendant is the sole owner or lessee, granting possession to the
plaintiff of the residence or household to the exclusion of the
defendant by evicting the defendant and/or restoring possession
to the plaintiff, or by consent agreement allowing the defendant
to provide suitable, alternate housing.
(4) Awarding temporary custody of and/or establishing
temporary visitation rights with regard to minor children."
To protect the victimized plaintiff from detriment upon being forced to
abandon the marital residence, the Act specifically provides that the
plaintiff's right to relief "shall not be affected by his or her leaving the
residence or household to avoid further abuse."
' 36
An order entered upon a petition filed pursuant to the Act insulates
the plaintiff from claims that the exclusion of the defendant from the
marital residence constitutes an "offer" to partition the entireties pro-
perty." 7 The Act goes further in that it expressly permits a court to grant
exclusive possession of the marital residence to the plaintiff-spouse even
if the premises are owned solely by the defendant. 38 While the constitu-
tionality of this Act is uncertain, so long as it is in effect it provides an
important remedy. It allows the creation of a legal barrier surrounding the
marital residence, a barrier that the defendant cannot penetrate without
becoming subject to the contempt powers of the court.
39
VIII. Post-Divorce Partition
Pennsylvania law provides that if no other disposition of property
belonging to the spouses has been made following a divorce, all property
titled in the name of one of the parties remains the separate property of
that person, while all joint tenancy property is converted into a tenancy in
common. 4° The parties may seek partition of joint property by the institu-
tion of appropriate proceedings, 4 1 and if sale of the premises is forced, the
parties share in the proceeds equally. If the premises were owned solely
by one of the parties, the other has no claim to ownership or possession
after divorce. Of course, one spouse may agree to convey the property to
the other or to permit limited possession of the premises.
IX. Conclusion
In the final analysis, the marital residence is the situs of numerous
battles that can have a devastating effect upon the lives of the spouses and
35. Id. § 6 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186).
36. Id. § 4 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10184).
37. Id. § 6(c) (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(c)).
38. Id. § 6(a)(2) (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(a)(2)).
39. Id. § 10 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10190).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 501 (Purdon 1965); Moss v. Moss, 80 Dauph. 312, 31 Pa.
D. & C.2d 88 (C.P. 1963).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 501 (1965). See also Shoup v. Shoup, - Pa. -, 364 A.2d
1319 (1976).
their families. It is often the most prized of possessions, and the bat-
tlefield upon which strategies are planned and carried into effect. While
the shell of the house remains, the ashes of the relationship leave the
marital residence but a painful reminder of what was or may have been.
In the end, divorce not only ends the marital relationship but often forces
the parties to sell the residence speedily and establish new roots for their
respective lives.

